Does the Silivri court verdict indeed confirm the existence of an “Ergenekon gang”? Can we assume that the Ergenekon trial was different in essence from the “out of routine” trials at previous “out of routine” periods? For example, was the atmosphere over the Silivri trial really different from that of the previous special court cases, including the Yassıada of 1960s that hanged a premier and two ministers? Which one was more transparent?
Even the trial of separatist chieftain Abdullah Öcalan was more transparent than the Silivri case. Perhaps unlike the separatist terrorist threat the “Ergenekon gang” was so geriatric that it could not pose a serious enough threat to force the government agree to transparency… Were the sentenced persons given during the trial the freedom to make an adequate defense? Was evidence against the accused gathered in line with the established rules? Did prosecutors also collect such evidence in favor of the defense of the sentenced and present them to the court? Or were there serious doubts verified with scientific reports that some of the evidence was planted and some was concocted at some place with digital expertise?
The Silivri sham ended with lofty sentences imposed on dignified personalities, as well as some others whose innocence is difficult to believe. How can anyone justify enforced life term plus 99 years behind bars or 34 years imprisonment sentences levied on journalists who might have even been involved in disseminating their horrendous obsessions through their writings.
Is it possible to say justice is done if yesterday’s top commander of this country is sentenced by a court of this country for being a gang leader and as such tried to topple the elected government of the country. Where is the gang? The court could not say a word on that… Now, we will have to wait for the ruling of the Supreme Court of Appeals. No one hopefully can prejudge what the Court of Appeals might say on the verdict of the special Silivri court with extraordinary powers. Right, courts with extraordinary powers were scrapped, but not those the ruling majority excluded in parliament… Why were those extraordinary courts scrapped? Extraordinary courts might deliver extraordinary decisions because the political climate might play a role in them… Well, was not that reason cited in Parliament a sufficient self confession?
There is freedom of thought and definitely press freedom in Turkey but only for ideas or news that are supportive of the government. If someone intends to criticize the government or dares to say a word against the absolute ruler His Imperial Highness Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, he must learn what might be best described as dancing on the sharp edge of a sword. Playing with words, hiding messages within lines has become a must in this land of advanced democracy where insult, harassment, downgrading, imprisonment of free thought has become a rather common practice.
Criticizing court verdicts is a crime in this country. Accusing a court of not delivering a ruling in line with laws and international norms of law but surrendering to the wishes, aspirations and hallucinations of a political administration may land one in prison even under the improved version of the Penal Code Article 301 regulating “crimes against Turkishness.”
This is an advanced democracy of the Justice and Development Party of Erdoğan. The message is clear: Love it or leave it… If you dare to raise your voice like those who did at Gezi Park in June, than you deserve to be ruthlessly disciplined by the master…