The insidious network inside the state
The fact that a police officer, Mevlüt Mert Altıntaş, can kill Russian Ambassador to Ankara Andrey Karlov shows us that the threat is still not eliminated. Even though the number of fired and suspended military officers, police and civil servants since the July 15 coup attempt has exceeded 100,000, it is apparent that members of FETÖ (Fethullahist Terrorist Organization) and similar terrorist networks are able to hide themselves within state structures.
We know that members of terror gangs will go to any lengths to sacrifice their lives in order to get hold of the state. They have attempted a bloody coup on July 15.
They have not given up yet. The assassination of Karlov has showed this. This network was not able to capture the state but by activating their secret cells and members, they are trying to harm the Turkish Republic as much as they can.
Using a police officer in the assassination is clearly a method that would harm Turkey’s international reputation in the most negative way.
The murder of an ambassador in Ankara by a police officer gives the message that Turkey is not safe, that even diplomats should not trust the Turkish police.
This last incident is very important in showing the extent of the stealth organization present inside the state. Despite all efforts of the state to remove and suspend members of this network, the “We are still in there” message has been given. Now, justifiably, the question “How many other members like this assassin police are within the state?” comes to our minds.
The cleanup in the police force has been going on for almost three years, but obviously they have not been totally removed. How many police there are and who have been able to hide themselves until now, we do not know.
The same question applies for the military too. We do not know how many more officers, pilots and noncommissioned officers there are dedicated and brainwashed to bomb their own people and the parliament.
Are there sufficient checks conducted in the recruitment process of these institutions? Is competence a priority when recruiting civil servants? We do not have clear answers to these questions. The assassin police officer Altıntaş was a 22-year-old who graduated from a police academy in 2014, which clearly shows there were inadequate security checks.
We have seen that one of the most widespread and effective networks of FETÖ were within the judiciary. We have watched with astonishment how members of the community had occupied positions within an institution that is supposed to be the ultimate place for democracy and a secular republic.
One of the top institutions of the judiciary, the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) admitted to the number of administrators in HSYK were in senior positions in high courts, determined name-by-name in bloodcurdling testimonies.
I wonder, how many judges and prosecutors are there today who have successfully hid themselves until this day, in the judiciary?
This situation points out to the need that the investigations conducted in all these institutions should continue meticulously.
Otherwise, it would not be possible to say “the threat is over” for a long time.
