How will the Hormuz crisis affect Türkiye?
Sefer Levent-ISTANBUL
As of July 13, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has slowed down significantly. According to Kpler data, only six oil tankers were able to pass through the strait on July 12. LNG carriers, meanwhile, made no transits over the weekend. Brent crude oil rose by nearly 5 percent on July 13, approaching $80 per barrel.
Under normal conditions, around 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products pass through the Strait of Hormuz each day. This represents roughly one-fifth of global oil supply. In addition, more than 110 billion cubic meters of LNG passed through the strait in 2025.
Although it may seem to be right on Türkiye’s doorstep, the country has no direct link to the oil transported through Hormuz. However, a prolonged closure of the strait affects not only oil prices but also all commodity prices, supply chains and ultimately costs across nearly every sector. Türkiye may not buy oil through Hormuz, but it cannot escape the prices shaped there.
The critical question ahead is this: If Hormuz remains closed and the increase in oil prices becomes permanent, what lies ahead for Türkiye?
According to calculations by the Turkish Central Bank, every permanent $10 increase in oil prices expands the current account deficit by approximately $2.6 billion over the following 12 months.
According to data published recently by Anadolu Agency, Türkiye’s energy import bill rose by 43.4 percent year-on-year in May, reaching $6.11 billion. This increase shows how rapidly energy prices were already exerting pressure on the external balance, even before the latest tensions in the Hormuz began.
If oil settles at $100 instead of $80 per barrel, a new gap of roughly $5 billion could emerge in Türkiye’s annual current account balance. If prices rise to $120 and remain at those levels, the burden could approach $10 billion.
An increase in oil prices first affects fuel costs and then spreads to transportation, production costs, food prices and the service sector.
According to the Central Bank, a permanent 10 percent oil price shock can increase consumer inflation by about one percentage point by the end of the first year.
Based on this calculation, a rise in oil prices from $80 to $100 per barrel could initially create an additional inflationary pressure of around 2 to 2.5 percentage points.
The Central Bank had already revised its year-end inflation forecast upward in its May Inflation Report, citing energy prices. If the problems in Hormuz become permanent, it would not be surprising to see the timetable for combating inflation reviewed once again.
The impact felt directly by citizens is reflected in fuel prices. The increase affects the entire chain, from products on supermarket shelves to factory costs. Rising LNG prices also influence electricity costs, natural gas prices and fertilizer production. A disruption in Hormuz today can be felt several months later in the prices of bread, vegetables and fruits.
Although the outlook surrounding the Strait of Hormuz appears bleak, Türkiye is better prepared than during previous crises.
Energy supply is no longer dependent on a single country. Diversification has increased through supplies from Russia, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and various LNG sources. Black Sea gas production and growing domestic oil output in recent years are gradually reducing external dependence.
Another important advantage is the Ceyhan pipeline. The full-capacity reopening of the Iraq–Türkiye Oil Pipeline could become a strategic factor that strengthens Türkiye’s position during such critical periods.
Ultimately, what is happening in the Strait of Hormuz is no longer merely an issue for energy markets. The pulse of the global economy beats through this narrow waterway.
Türkiye’s tankers may not pass through Hormuz, but its current account deficit, inflation and production costs are affected by every development there. The key question today is not whether oil will reach $100 per barrel, but how long this uncertainty will last. The longer it continues, the larger the economic bill Türkiye will have to pay.