What is a comprehensive settlement? (II)
The objective of Cyprus talks ought to be to bring about a comprehensive settlement enshrining either a new partnership on which to build a better future in peace, security and prosperity on a united island or side-by-side co-existence of two friendly states on the island of Cyprus.
Thus, while the ultimate aim ought to be to reach a federal solution reinstituting unity of the island, if that effort fails the prospect of “peace in being separated” should not be ignored.
This, however, should not be taken as a “confession” that Turkish Cypriots are after division, a two-state resolution of the Cyprus problem. Yet, in fact, should the Greek Cypriot side continue its intransigence in reaching a power-sharing federation, why should Turkish Cypriots be left out in the cold forever without a state? Obviously, as the Turkish accession talks decision by the EU Council has said, what might be the outcome of negotiations cannot be pre-decided. They might lead to federation, if Greek Cypriots have good faith, or may lead to permanent separation and two friendly states living side-by-side on the island. To be honest, to the dislike of Turkey and many big game-setters that’s what most Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots want.
It is obvious that a settlement to the Cyprus problem can only be reached if and when the two parties on Cyprus are given fully equal status. Instead of playing around with what “political equality” or “full equality” might mean and waste further time, those wishing to see a resolution of the Cyprus problem should concentrate on finding leverage that might force Greek Cypriots concede that the state and government they have are not in any way representing the whole island and the entire population of the island, and that there are two peoples, two democracies, two legal entities on Cyprus that ought to negotiate a settlement.
One way of convincing Greek Cypriots to see the reality on the land and sit talks with a pro-solution resolve rather than trying to kill time might be to tell them that there is a deadline and at some point should there still be no settlement on the island, the Turkish Cypriot state “may” be recognized. That would work and force Greek Cypriots to wake up from the utopia that they are the Cyprus government representing the entire island, a position marring a resolution since the 1968 start of Cyprus talks.
For exactly the same reasons, if there will ever be a new Cyprus partnership state, it should not be considered just the continuity of the Cyprus Republic, but as one that came to being through “parthenogenesis” or “virgin birth” through transfer of sovereignty by two founding states which withheld some residual sovereign rights for themselves. Thus, if ever in the future Greek Cypriots engage once again in the madness of collapsing the partnership state, they should not get away with their crimes, or rewarded because they are the majority. In such a case Turkish Cypriots ought to have the right to withdraw whatever sovereignty they transferred to the partnership state and declare their sovereign independent state. Walking such a road, however, might be strictly conditioned in order to soothe Greek Cypriot worries that Turkish Cypriots might arbitrarily seek secession from the partnership state.
