Global rearrangement of power-sharing
Things are going wild. Some pundits argue of the need to go to a regional rearrangement of power-sharing, while some argue for a global one. No one should dream of having any share in this power game while there are at least three major international players: The United States, Russia and the European Union. China, on the one hand, is also trying to enter the game, while on the other, attempting to consolidate itself in the African and Eurasian spheres through economic and financial entrepreneurial undertakings.
The world perhaps may not need another Yalta conference of the two superpowers of the post-World War II Europe. But one way or another the residues of the World War II system, and the so-called secret Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1916, will have to be replaced with a new world order.
Whether we want a bi-zonal or bi-communal federation, confederation, two independent states or two states in the EU, do we have the luxury to ignore the presence and interests of Russia in this region? Not only through the Cyprus Church and the communist Progressive People’s Party (Akel), Russia has leverages which, if used, might paralyze everything on and around Cyprus. Any Cyprus deal ought to take into consideration the Russian interests factor as well. Why, for example, has Akel changed its opinion from supportive to rejectionist regarding the 2004 U.N. peace plan for Cyprus? What was the role played by Russia in that decision that killed a golden opportunity? Or perhaps it ought to be considered well — can Russia accept a Cyprus resolution with which the island might become a NATO territory, fully integrated in the European Union and become a de facto American watch post?
Whatever the eventual settlement of the Syrian quagmire might be, irrespective of whether the Kurds, like those in Iraq, end up with an autonomous self-administering region, can it be possible to achieve anything by undermining the Russian interests in that country and beyond? Turkey and Iran are, of course, among some other major elements in deciding the future of Syria, but if and when the United States and Russia agree on a power-sharing scheme in the region, could either of them play any worthy role in shaping tomorrow’s Syria or whatever might be left of it?
Does it matter how rich might be the hydrocarbon findings of foreign companies unilaterally given contracts by the Greek Cypriot government to explore in the exclusive economic zone of the island? Not only problems of how any hydrocarbon find might reach international markets or whether Turkey would continue abiding by its pledge to be the primary customer, how realistic would it be to expect Russia to sit idly and allow European – and Turkish – dependency on energy be altered drastically?
As farfetched and illusionary as it might appear for now, could it be ruled out altogether the prospect of President Donald Trump’s Eurosceptic U.S. to engage in a power-sharing with Russia, trade the Middle East influence with isolation of China and usher the world into a new global power-sharing regime?
If the “withdrawal from Syria” remark of Trump is to be evaluated within such a scope, it might be argued perfectly well that something might be drastically changed not only in Syria, Cyprus, and the Middle East, but globally too.