Assad junk bond and Baathist market
What will happen if Assad does not leave? This question began to be asked more often with the Russian and Chinese veto of the U.N. resolution that would allow intervention in Syria.
This question also serves as the basis of another issue: What will Turkey do if Assad does not leave and if the Bath regime is not dismantled? How will Turkey get out of this quandary it has found itself in? Was it really rational to oppose Syria so blatantly when it houses so many of the regional problems? Since the world does not really seem willing to intervene, the Baath regime is likely to maintain its existence. Moreover, it has the continued support of Russia, China, Iran and the Maliki government.
These ordinary and shallow statements seem rational and coherent on the surface. However, there are sound reasons why these statements and criticisms are common and shallow. They are common because they are the products of nonchalant and indifferent approaches. They are shallow because they are based not on the problem itself but on the different positions the involved actors and powers will take. And this leads to many errors. Nevertheless, these statements are effective criticisms because they have a media appeal. Their perceived support, even if on a tangent, of the third world resistance dreams is enough for these statements to find a wide audience.
Who needs to think about what will happen if Assad does not leave is no other than those who stand behind the Baath regime. After the U.N. Security Council this situation has become even clearer. It is necessary to ask those who invested on a bond with no future such as the Assad regime in the collapsing market of Middle Eastern dictatorships whether they are celebrating a strategic victory in the aftermath of the U.N. Security Council decision or preparing for the disaster looming on the horizon.
There is nothing to do for the Baath regime supporters, who find it difficult to explain it even to themselves why they invested in the Assad bond, in the short run. They are regretting their stupidity behind doors while scrambling to legitimize the Assad regime, at least partially, in front of the cameras. This is not a policy they can maintain in the long run.
When this is the current situation, producing disaster scenarios for Turkey over the question “what Turkey will do if Assad does not leave” is an approach that is not only incoherent but also one that tries to conceal the junk bond investments made on the Russian-Iranian axis.
Clearly, in this current situation, the most important actor of the tensions experienced over Syria is the Baath regime. It is also the leading cause of any probable military intervention in Syria. No actor or state could have harmed Syria or carve the space for an external intervention more than the Baath regime.
The only thing that will happen if the Assad regime in Syria is not overthrown is the continued political junk bond problem whose existence is extended slightly while its default risk is increased. Any probable default will certainly affect Turkey and the region.
The Assad bond will do more than affect its holders; it will harm them. In fact, the probable disappearance of this bond they are holding belongs to 20th century Middle East dictators and Baathist regime market! That market is in the process of liquidation!