Why Turkey should worry about Iran

Turkey’s recent “coziness” with Iran has raised a few eyebrows lately, as a flurry of analysis has appeared in the Western press regarding Turkish alignment with Iran.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly vouched for the Iranian nuclear program and recently called Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a “good friend.” Such developments worry many in the West, as well as in Turkey. However, in government circles, it is clear that the program is not perceived as a threat to Turkish interests. Such a view is misguided and naïve at best.

I believe there are at least three reasons why Turkey should worry about Iranian nuclear ambitions.

First, Turkey has had at least a “cold peace,” if not amicable relations, with Iran for almost four centuries because there always has been a relative balance of power between the two countries. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, that balance will become tilted.

In the current state of affairs, the Turkish government might think that Turkey will not be a target for Iranian nuclear weapons. But times, governments and intentions change. In international politics, the future is uncertain; therefore, states must concern themselves with capabilities rather than intentions. A nuclear-armed Tehran will definitely disturb the balance of power between Turkey and Iran.

Furthermore, Turkey and Iran are natural rivals in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, where they compete for political, economic and social influence. It is inevitable that their interests will collide down the road. A stronger, nuclear-armed Iran might decide that it has a greater chance of prevailing in a conflict with Turkey or could use its nuclear weapons as tools for blackmailing or baiting third countries in the aforementioned regions to extend its influence.

Second, if Iran develops nuclear weapons, it could trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East by pushing others, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and perhaps eventually even Turkey, to pursue their own nuclear-weapons programs. A nuclear Middle East, with its authoritarian regimes, weak state institutions and radical groups, is not in the interest of Turkey. If the world’s powder keg, the Middle East, turned into a nuclear powder keg, several things could go wrong. Such a future is a far cry from the stable, peaceful and prosperous region envisioned by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero-problems policy.”

Lastly, regardless of whether Iran currently has a secret nuclear-weapons program or not, it is clear the Iranian regime would at least like to acquire the ability to produce such weapons within a few months’ notice (termed the “breakout point”). Therefore, the lack of any “smoking gun” should not be construed as a lack of intent.

There are plenty of reasons why Iran might want to have the bomb, especially as a deterrent against possible attempts by the United States to effect a regime change in Tehran. That, however, does not relieve Iran, a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, from its treaty obligations. Iran has been less than forthcoming in its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, and has repeatedly concealed information or engaged in sophisticated disinformation campaigns regarding its nuclear program.

Turkey should thus take Iranian claims with a grain of salt and refrain from being Iran’s advocate. Doing otherwise means Turkey will be seen as an apologist and an ally of a regime that is perceived as a serious threat to international peace and security by the majority of democratic states. This will seriously undermine the Turkish position in NATO as well as its status as a candidate for the European Union. Being estranged from the West is not in the national interest of Turkey.

The Turkish government is currently not worried about Iran’s nuclear program. However, it is not wise to sit back and watch as an authoritarian regime in your backyard acquires nuclear capabilities. Hopefully Turkey will realize this mistake before it is too late.

* Balkan Devlen is an assistant professor at the İzmir University of Economics.