Happy hour for hardliners

I am one of many pundits who made this point on numerous occasions in the past: The struggle to solve the Kurdish problem is not a fight between Turks on the one hand and Kurds on the other. It is a tough battle between Turks and Kurds who are willing to find a political compromise on one side and Turks and Kurds who are not interested in finding a solution on the other side. What has happened over the last couple of weeks in Turkey is a text book example of the conflict theory that says that, when the moderates are getting close to a deal, the radicals on both sides of the conflict will do their utmost to wreck that process. We have seen it happen in Northern Ireland before, on the Westbank and in Israel. We are witnessing it again in Izmir, in Tokat, in Istanbul and in Ankara.

The decision by the Constitutional Court to close down the Democratic Society Party, or DTP, is just the last domino that is falling over, set in motion by a perfidious coalition of Turks and Kurds who are willing to do everything to stop the process of reconciliation that was recently started by the government. Who are the main culprits?

First and foremost, the blame falls on opposition leaders Deniz Baykal and Devlet Bahçeli. They deliberately kept on pouring oil on the fire while the ruling party was trying to extinguish the flames. They used the big words from the classic nationalist vocabulary: The Kurdish initiative was treacherous; it was a deal between the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, and terrorists and it would lead to the destruction of the Turkish Republic. They knew that only by hammering this message home continuously, they could corner the government and force it to stop the project. On top of that, physical violence was provoked or organized to create an atmosphere of hate and suspicion. The disturbing conclusion must be that this policy of intimidation paid off. In opinion polls almost 50 percent agreed that the AKP was making a big mistake.

The other partner in crime is Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, leader Abdullah Öcalan. Since his capture in 1999, he always had one goal only and that was to remain the leader with whom the Turkish state should make a deal. A successful democratic initiative would have meant an end to those dreams. That is why the killing of soldiers started again, malcontented youngsters were drummed up to throw stones at the police and why, finally, the moderates in the DTP were sidelined. It is the tragedy of people like Ahmet Türk and Aysel Tugluk: They were stabbed twice, first by their “comrades,” then by the judges of the Constitutional Court. But didn’t they make huge mistakes? Yes, they did. They thought they could clutch the party from Öcalan’s hands by supporting his maximalist demands and by losing patience when the AKP slowed down the process.

That is where the third guilty party comes in. The AKP’s mistakes cannot be compared to the obstructionist policies of their opponents. But it was wrong to drag the initiative on for such a long time without coming up with clear and visible solutions. The government got cold feet when they saw how determined and successful the opposition was and how little they could count on the DTP for backing.

The worst thing that can happen now is further polarization between ordinary Turks and Kurds. That would only strengthen the feeling among the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, and the Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP, that they were right and it would probably lead Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to conclude that, in order to survive in the next elections, he should backtrack quickly.

I still believe, even after all that has happened, that there is a majority of Turks and Kurds that realizes that going down this path would be a disaster. I still hope there is some courage left with the AKP leadership that should be used to continue the democratic opening they started and that the country so badly needs.