Westerwelle and Kiev’s European perspective

The issue of an EU membership perspective for Ukraine is central to this young democracy’s current foreign relations and future domestic development. At least, this is what many members of Kyiv’s political and intellectual elite believe – arguably, for good reasons. The prospect of becoming a fully accepted “member of the European family” was, in the opinion of many in both the West and East, critical for the Central European as well as Baltic countries in the 1990s. It was a major driving force in the quick transition of these post-totalitarian states into largely liberal democracies today.

Ukraine has been lacking this incentive for comprehensive democratization and effective state-building so far. The EU has adopted a position that, depending on who in Brussels and the Union’s surrounding institutions or groups you talk too, is more or less vague. With the announcement of the composition of Germany’s future cabinet last week, there has emerged a chance that the EU’s approach towards Ukraine may become clearer. In the coming four years, the regular term of Germany’s new government, Ukraine may be provided with an opportunity to improve its standing as a possible future candidate for EU membership.

As had been expected since the announcement of the results of the Bundestag elections in late September 2009, the head of the economically right-wing and politically liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), Guido Westerwelle, was not only announced as the Federal Republic’s future Vice-Chancellor. The internationally little-known, but domestically prolific leader of the German liberals also received the post of Foreign Minister. This particular fact is insofar relevant for EU-Ukrainian relations as the FDP is the only German party that has clearly stated, in the programs for both the European and German parliamentary elections last summer, that Ukraine may one day have the option to apply for EU membership. The respective passage in the European and German parliamentary election programs of the FDP says: “The states of the Western Balkans have a medium- to long-term perspective to join the EU – a position supported by the FDP. In the long run, this

also applies to Ukraine.”

It needs to be added that, while Germany is an important country, the FRG is only one of the 27 states formulating EU foreign policies. Moreover, with the creation of a Union foreign service, after the adoption of the Lissabon Treaty, the influence of national ministries of international affairs, including Germany’s Auswaertiges Amt, on pan-European politics will decline; and it remains to be seen which position the new EU Foreign Minister will take towards Ukraine. Also, Germany’s system of rule is a “chancellor’s democracy” meaning that the Federal Republic’s head of government Angela Merkel determines the main directions in all areas, including foreign policy. Merkel represents Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) that has been more ambivalent on Ukraine’s possible entry into the EU. The position of the CDU’s Bavarian sister party and third government coalition partner, the Christian Social Union (CSU), can be said to be

anti-Ukrainian: In spite of Munich’s close relations with Kyiv, the CSU’s political program implies that, among other countries, Ukraine has no EU membership perspective whatsoever.

It also needs to be admitted that Ukraine is currently not a salient issue in either German or EU external affairs. Finally, in Germany like in other countries, electoral party programs, as the FDP’s, not always fully reflect what party functionaries do after gaining governmental positions.

It is thus not clear what the partial change of personnel and policy line in the German cabinet will mean, for Ukraine. Still, even a short line within a long political program, like the one sentence on Ukraine in the FDP’s official agenda, is not a trivial phenomenon in as developed a democracy as Germany’s. The status of the party program is above statements of individual preferences of – even, influential – party leaders. As the program has been collectively formulated and democratically approved by the FDP’s elected organs, it has a weight (and could even develop a dynamic) of its own. Ukraine may be one of the last issues currently on Westerwelle’s mind. However, both Ukrainian political leaders and pro-Ukrainian civic actors in the West, have now the opportunity to mention the respective sentence of the FDP’s European and national electoral programs when discussing with Westerwelle Ukraine’s future.

To this, for Ukraine, already fortunate situation, one might add that the FDP did, in Germany’s new coalition government, not only receive the Foreign Service, but also the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development that administers most of the German foreign aid programs, including those related to Ukraine. The FDP’s current General Secretary Dirk Niebel will be heading this ministry – a fact that came as a surprise to many observers as the liberals had been demanding the abolishment of that ministry. Whatever the particular circumstances of these decisions, Kyiv will now have two institutional partners in Germany’s government who are headed by politicians, presumably, in favor of a long-term EU membership perspective for Ukraine.

* Dr Andreas Umland is Assistant Professor of Contemporary East European History at The Catholic University of Eichstaett-Ingolstadt, Bavaria (http://ku-eichstaett.academia.edu/AndreasUmland ), and General Editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society” (http://www.ibidem-verlag.de/spps.html ).