Solidarity with Tehran?

The international community rarely agrees on what constitutes a “concern” or a “threat” to security and peace. One rare instance of such agreement is about Iran’s confrontational rhetoric and non-cooperation regarding its nuclear activities.

However, not much has changed in Turkey’s stance regarding Iran. After last year’s failed negotiations, the U.S.-led Western block is preparing to adopt tougher sanctions on Iran. Turkey, the only neighboring country to Iran in the U.N. Security Council, is trying to avoid further escalation of the crisis and does not want any sanctions in the region.

In Tehran, finding a diplomatic solution seems unlikely. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was recently quoted saying “Iran’s nuclear path is irreversible” in a facility where he introduced an enhanced centrifuge for faster uranium enrichment. The U.N. nuclear watchdog agency, the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, reported that without further assistance by the Iranian government, it won’t be able to rule out the possibility of a nuclear weapons program. Tehran, on the other hand, sees the IAEA with suspicion and question the objectivity of current efforts.

Even though Tehran argues its program is for peaceful purposes, questions remain regarding its intentions.

It is known that Tehran often exaggerates its military capabilities. But most of its defense spending concentrates around offensive equipment. In early April, a top Iranian general showcased an indigenously developed unmanned aerial vehicle arguing it could strike targets with high precision. Tehran also spends considerable resources on developing advanced ballistic missiles, and over the last years it has successfully tested several. The IAEA calls Iran’s missile development program a “matter of serious concern.” Iran also launched a rocket capable of carrying a satellite during the negotiations for an IAEA-brokered agreement to settle the disputes with the West.

Yet, it is not only the United States, Israel or France that are worried about Tehran’s intentions. A look at the defense spending in Iran’s neighborhood shows the level of concerns in the region. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates invest heavily on acquiring advanced fighter jets and air defense systems. Although Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is concerned about Israel’s nuclear weapons, Turkey is also planning to spend billions of dollars in purchasing air defense systems and over 100 of one of the most expensive fighter aircrafts ever built.

Experts, on the other hand, point out that sanctions create limited or no change, and isolate the target country and its population. They often cause devastating effects in the economy while making little change at the government level. Current sanctions on Iran by the U.N., the European Union and the U.S. did not change how Tehran functions, and some argue they actually provoked its confrontational nuclear strategy. New sanctions could also increase distrust toward the international community among Iranians; a great tool for Tehran to manipulate public opinion. Conditions brought by sanctions could also diminish what is left of the opposition to the Ahmadinejad government.

Ankara supports diplomacy and is willing to mediate between the West and Tehran. Turkey’s so-called strategic depth, a foreign policy concept emphasizing Turkey’s soft power deriving from its cultural and historical presence in the region, is the basis of Ankara’s approach to the problem. But, over-relying on Ankara’s influence in Tehran and using foreign affairs as campaign material at home doesn’t serve the country’s interests.

Instead of being part of the discussion, Turkey wastes too much time and effort on issues that are not the primary concerns. Ankara not only loses its objectivity, but also appears as an ineffective actor that doesn’t have much to offer. Whether it is the inequality between the reactions given to Darfur and Gaza; or losing reliability by abruptly uninviting Israel from a planned air force exercise, Justice and Development Party, or AKP, foreign policy damages Turkey’s credibility.

Yet, one must look beyond the strategic depth rhetoric to understand Ankara. Two issues shape how Turkey moves regarding Iran: economic interests and energy needs. Turkey has growing economic relations with Iran, the trade volume between the two recently reaching the 10 billion dollar mark. And, after Russia, Iran is Turkey’s second biggest natural gas supplier. In other words, Turkey’s pragmatic interests are directly related to new sanctions on Iran.

However, declaring that Turkey will not support any sanctions before even knowing the details, limits Ankara’s options. Instead of speaking in absolute terms, Ankara should both communicate with Tehran and actively participate in sanction discussions. Supporting limited sanctions that would protect Turkish interests might be an option.

The West believes Iran manipulated international efforts and diplomacy, and instead gained time to further its nuclear weapons program. Unless the dialogue is carried out on Iran’s terms, which distrusts the IAEA and any U.S.-led mechanism, a diplomatic solution seems unlikely. No matter how hard Ankara tries, Tehran will not be convinced to cooperate simply because it would mean giving up the progress it has made in its nuclear program. The right thing to do for Turkish foreign policy-makers now might be to see the bigger picture and work on limiting the effects of sanctions on Turkish interests instead of declaring solidarity with Tehran.

* Murat Onur is a graduate student of Security Policy Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. The views expressed here are his own. A different version of this column originally appeared in International Affairs Review. He can be reached at mfo@gwmail.gwu.edu